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Abstract
We test whether managerial human capital has a first order effect on the performance and growth of small
enterprises in emerging markets. In a randomized control trial in Puebla, Mexico, we randomly assigned 150 out
of 432 small and medium size enterprises to receive subsidized consulting services, while the remaining 267
enterprises served as a control group that did not receive any subsidized training. Treatment enterprises were
matched with one of nine local consulting firms and met with their consultants once a week for four hours over
a one year period. Results from a follow‐up survey, conducted after the intervention, show that the consulting
services had a large impact on the performance of the enterprises in the treatment group: monthly sales went
up by about 80 percent; similarly, profits and productivity increased by 120 percent compared to the control
group. We also see a significant increase in the entrepreneurial spirit index for the treatment group, a set of
questions designed to illicit the SME owners’ confidence in their ability to manage their business and deal with
any future difficulties. However, we do not find any significant increase in the number of workers employed in
the treatment group.

Keywords: Enterprise growth; entrepreneurship; managerial capital
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1. Introduction
A large literature in development economics and entrepreneurship aims to understand the impediments
to firm growth, especially for small and medium size enterprises. Financial constraints are often put forward as a
central obstacle to firm growth. The empirical literature has documented these constraints at the micro level
(see Banerjee et al 2010, de Mel et al 2008, and Karlan and Zinman 2011) as well as at the macro level (see for
example King and Levine 1993 or Rajan and Zingales 1998).
However, capital alone cannot generate growth; one must also know how to use it. Bruhn, Karlan and
Schoar (2010) discusses at more length the role of “managerial capital” as a key component for enterprise
development, distinct from human capital. We argue that managerial capital can directly affect the firm by
improving the strategic and operational decisions, but it also affects the productivity of other factors such as
physical capital and labor by helping to use them more efficiently. Recent work by Bertrand and Schoar (2003),
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007 and 2010), and Bennedson et al (2007) shows enormous heterogeneity in
management practices and CEO styles across firms. But a central question remains: is this observed
heterogeneity a reflection of an optimal match between the underlying fundamentals of different firms and the
adequate level of management given the firm’s state of development? Or are differences in management style
and lack of managerial capital a first order impediment to firm growth and profitability? Managers in developing
countries might be constrained in the acquisition of these skills, if such skills require either formal training or
experience in other well‐run enterprises, or both (see for example Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein 2005 or
Caselli and Gennaioli 2005).
We test if lack of managerial capital has a first order effect on the performance and growth of small
enterprises in emerging markets. We focus on small businesses since in this setting the owner/manager can
easily be determined as the main decision maker, and in addition these enterprises are often seen as having the
most potential for scale up if bottlenecks to their growth can be removed. In order to test this idea more
systematically we set up a randomized control trial in Puebla, Mexico, where 432 small and medium size
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enterprises applied to receive subsidized consulting services, and 150 out of the 432 were randomly chosen to
receive the treatment. The remaining 267 enterprises served as a control group that did not receive any
subsidized consulting services. Treatment enterprises were matched with one of nine local consulting firms
based on the specialized services they needed. On average, enterprises met with their consultants once a week
for four hours over a one year period. The enterprise owner and consulting firm decided jointly on the focus and
scope of the consulting services.
This intervention is a joint test of two closely related dimensions: On the one hand we aim to establish if
managerial capital is a limiting factor in the growth of enterprises. But the test at the same time depends on
whether this knowledge can be conveyed via a consulting intervention in the first place. We cannot test
separately the above two questions. For example, it could be that managerial capital is indeed a hindrance to
growth, but it might not be possible to transfer this knowledge by simply providing consulting services.
Therefore, failure to find a result here would not prove that managerial capital does not matter, since failure to
find a result may simply mean that this program was not effective in the transmission of managerial skills (or
that managerial skills are innate skills and simply not teachable). Our results can only be interpreted as a
reduced form of the effects of managerial capital as provided through a consulting intervention.
We find that our consulting intervention had a large impact on the performance of the enterprises in the
treatment group: monthly sales went up by about 80 percent; similarly, profits and productivity increased by
120 percent and one fifth of a standard deviation, respectively, compared to the control group. However, we do
not find any significant increase in the number of workers employed in treatment enterprises. The results of the
intervention are quite large but we believe that they are reasonable given the context of the intervention: The
enterprises in our sample were started by people who are not professional managers and many of them had not
received any formal management training at all prior to our intervention.
When looking at the process by which these changes are brought about we find that enterprises in the
treatment group show a significant increase in their likelihood to engage in marketing efforts and are more likely
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to keep formal accounts about their firms. But we also test for several other changes in business processes and
do not find any consistent pattern. We do however find a pronounced impact on an index of what we call
“entrepreneurial spirit“. This index is a combined measure of answers to a set of questions on the enterprise
owner’s beliefs about their ability to control the success of their business (or whether they are merely subject to
external forces outside of their control) and on the owner’s drive for success 2 . The increase in this index might
reflect the fact that enterprise owners set new goals as part of the program and that consultants helped to
provide motivation and strategy for how to achieve these goals. In addition, enterprise owners’ increased
confidence in their ability to control the success of their business could be driven by having better command of
management tools such as marketing and bookkeeping. Additional support for this interpretation might be
derived from the fact that businesses in the treatment group report no significant drop in sales but proactively
adjust to the 2008 economic crisis by cutting costs.
Research and practice have recently seen a flurry of programs focused on developing managerial capital
for microenterprises (i.e. enterprises typically with zero employees, or under five at the most). The interventions
vary widely in the scope of the management skills that are transmitted and the type of enterprises that are
targeted. The training is typically provided as in‐class training, often linked with a microcredit program. For
example, Karlan and Valdivia (2010) and Drexler, Fischer and Schoar (2010) evaluate in‐class programs. These
papers show that traditional microenterprise training seems to affect the command of accounting practices for
microenterprises, but haslimited to no effects on actual firm outcomes and performance. Drexler, Fischer and
Schoar finds that a rule of thumb based training program that focuses strictly on separating business from
household money appears to have a more significant impact on firm sales and savings. More recently, Bruhn and
Zia (2011) and Gine and Mansuri (2011) also find that in‐class training for microentrepreneurs leads to
improvements in business practices but has only limited effects on business performance and sales.
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See Appendix 1 for the list of questions used to construct the entrepreneurial spirit index.
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Bloom et al (2010) is more closely rated to our study in that they evaluate the impact of intensive
consulting services from an international management consulting firm on the business practices of large Indian
textile firms. The average firm in their sample has about 270 employees, whereas the average number of
employees in our study is 14. Bloom et al find that even these larger firms were unaware of many modern
management practices, and treated plants improved their management practices during the intervention. The
approaches of Bloom et al and this study are complementary in nature: Bloom et al focuses on a small set of
large firms in one industry, textile manufacturing, with a tightly defined intervention by a major international
consulting firm. The current study includes a larger set of firms and industries (close to 400 firms compared to
20 experimental plants in Bloom et al and employs a heterogeneous set of local consulting firms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the subsidized consulting
program. Section 3 discusses the experimental setup, data collection, and characteristics of our sample. Section
4 gives the results, examining both business outcomes and business process variables. Section 5 asks why more
enterprises do not use consulting services, i.e., given these results, what are the possible market failures in the
consulting services industry? Section 6 concludes.

2. Consulting Program
We conducted a randomized control trial in collaboration with the Puebla Institute for Competitive
Productivity (known as IPPC, after its Spanish acronym), a training institute set up by the Ministry of Labor of the
Mexican State of Puebla. IPPC implemented a business development program to provide participating
enterprises with subsidized consulting services from one of a number of local consulting firms. The program,
which started in March 2008 and ended in February 2009, aimed to include 100 micro, 40 small, and 10
medium‐sized enterprises 3 and actually included 108 micro enterprises, 34 small enterprises and 8 medium‐size
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enterprises have between 11 and 50 full‐time employees in the manufacturing and services sectors and between 11 and 30
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enterprises. The primary goal was to help enterprises reach the next size category by the end of the program
and thus contribute to job creation and economic growth of the region.
Consultants were asked to (1) diagnose the problems that prevented the enterprises from growing, (2)
suggest solutions that would help to solve the problems and (3) assist enterprises in implementing the solutions.
The consultants dedicated four hours per week to each enterprise on average. The program was originally
intended to last two years but ended prematurely after one year due to government funding issues. Thus the
implementation phase was shortened.
The consulting services were highly subsidized by the State of Puebla. Micro enterprises paid only 10
percent of the market cost of the consulting services, small enterprises 20 percent, and medium sized
enterprises about 30 percent. The unsubsidized cost of the consulting services varied by firm size but was
equivalent to about US$57 4 per hour on average, amounting to US$11,856 per firm for one year (4 hours for 52
weeks).
Consulting firms were selected through a competitive bidding process. In response to a call for proposals
put out by IPPC, eleven consulting firms submitted proposals to participate in the program. Two firms were
eliminated based on inadequate references from former clients. The majority of the participating firms were
private local consulting firms that usually work with micro, small, and medium size enterprises.
At the beginning of the program, principal decision makers, as well as most employees, from all program
enterprises completed a computerized test that determined their individual strengths and talents. This test was
based on Gallup’s StrengthFinder method and IPPC was licensed to conduct this test in Puebla. IPPC encouraged
enterprises to use the results of this test to help assign employees to responsibilities based on their strengths as
identified by the StrengthFinder method. The consultants were trained in helping the enterprises interpret and
apply the results to their labor decisions. For example, one talent was “communication” whereas another was

full‐time employees in the commerce sector. Medium size enterprises have up to 100 full‐time employees in the service
and commerce sectors and up to 250 full‐time employees in the manufacturing sector.
4
700 Mexican Pesos (MXP)
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“operations”. Employees with the communication talent were particularly suited to interacting with clients,
while employees with the operations talent would do well at record keeping and accounting.
Apart from the employee talent diagnostic, the content of the consulting varied across enterprises
depending on their needs. In order to gain an understanding of the issues that enterprises worked on with their
mentors, we conducted in‐depth case studies of eight treatment enterprises. Table 1 lists the areas that these
eight enterprises covered with their consultants, along with the number of enterprises that worked on each
topic. Almost all enterprises started by establishing mission and vision statements with their consultants, setting
specific goals for what they wanted to achieve in the future and throughout the program. Most enterprises also
worked on improving accounting and record keeping (through training and/or use of new software), clearly
assigning staff responsibilities, and sales strategy and advertising. Apart from these common topics, the
remaining topics covered are diverse, including optimizing the number and location of points of sale, quality
control, access to credit or alternative financing solutions, pricing strategy, team work and leadership training.
This reflects the fact that the consultants tailored their advice to each enterprise’s individual challenges, leading
them to work on different areas with each enterprise.

7

3. Experimental Setup and Data
For the implementation of the program, IPPC advertised the program throughout the State of Puebla via
various media outlets in order to attract an initial sample of interested micro, small, and medium enterprises. In
response to the advertising, 432 enterprises expressed interest in the program and signed a letter of interest. A
baseline survey of these interested enterprises was conducted between October and December 2007. This
survey collected information on enterprise characteristics and performance, as well as on business practices and
characteristics of the enterprise’s principal decision maker (typically the owner or manager).
Using data from the baseline survey, 150 enterprises were randomly selected to participate in the
program 5 . The randomization was stratified by sector (manufacturing, services, and commerce) and enterprise
size (micro, small, and medium‐sized) 6 , conducted through a Stata program that was run on the premises of
IPPC in the presence of government officials and a public notary, who certified that the assignment to the
treatment group was random, i.e., not re‐run depending on any particular assignments.
Out of the 150 enterprises in the treatment group, 80 chose to take up the consulting services 7 . The
remaining treatment group enterprises declined to participate in the program although they had initially signed
a letter of interest saying that they would participate if offered a spot. Most enterprises that chose not to
participate said their financial situation had changed since they signed the letter of interest and they no longer
had sufficient funds to pay the fee (albeit subsidized) for the consulting services. IPPC paired the 80 treatment
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We originally had 434 observations in the randomization and assigned 150 of them to treatment, but we later discovered
that two firms had expressed interest in the program twice under separate names. For this reason, we had to drop two
observations, giving us 432 unique firms. In one of the cases, both separate names were in the control group, and we
dropped one of these. In the other case, one name was assigned to the treatment group and the other to the control group.
Here, we had to keep the firm in the treatment group since they had already been notified that they had been randomly
selected to participate in the program.
6
Within strata, we re‐randomized until the maximum t‐statistic on the differences in averages across the treatment and
control groups of the following variables was above 1.25 and the average t‐statistic was above 0.35: Within Puebla City
dummy, business age, total asset value, profit margin, measured risk aversion, entrepreneurial spirit index, currently has a
loan from a financial institution dummy, principal decision maker’s hours worked, principal decision maker’s age, principal
decision maker’s gender, principal decision maker’s years of schooling, principal decision maker is of indigenous
background dummy, as well as two dummies indicating whether the firm has participated in other IPPC programs.
7
Due to an administrative error, there was also one control group firm that was invited to participate, and did, in the
program. For analysis purposes, we adhere to the random assignment and this enterprise is included in the control group.
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group enterprises that took‐up the program with consulting firms according to the consultants’ sector and
enterprise‐size expertise, as well as geographic restrictions.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of baseline characteristics for enterprises and their principal
decision makers in the treatment and control groups. About 30 percent of enterprises in each group operated in
the manufacturing sector, 25 percent in the commerce sector, and 45 percent in the services sector. On average,
the enterprises in the study had about 14 full‐time paid employees and were slightly over 10 years old. The
enterprises’ principal decision makers were on average 43 years old, 72 percent of them were men, and they
had completed 16 years of schooling.
Panel C of Table 2 displays our main measures of business performance, starting with last month’s sales.
This variable varies widely in our sample. At baseline, average last month’s sales in the treatment group was
US$76,343 with a standard deviation of 283,025, and US$50,844 in the control group, with a standard deviation
of 119,987. To reduce the noise in this variable, we drop the top one percent of outliers, after controlling for
enterprise size group (micro, small, and medium size, as defined above). This reduces the standard deviation by
a factor of about three in the treatment group and by 1.3 in the control group. The averages of the trimmed
variables are more similar across the treatment and control groups (US$40,479 and US$46,113, respectively)
than for the untrimmed variable.
We use two different measures of profits in this paper. The first one is calculated as last month’s sales
minus costs. The second one is calculated based on last month’s sales and reported profit margin, where the
profit margin was obtained by asking “For every 100 pesos of sales/revenue, how many pesos of costs does the
business have?” 8 De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009) use a similar question when measuring profits to
adjust for differences in the timing of inputs and sales of outputs 9 . One important difference between our two
measures of profits is that profits calculated from profit margin and sales do not have negative values since the
8

The formula used to calculate these profits is: Profits=Sales*(1‐“Pesos of costs per 100 pesos in sales”/100).
De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2009) also suggest asking business owners directly what their profits are as an
alternative to calculating profits based on underlying variables. We tried this approach but had a very high non‐response
rate to this question.
9
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respondents did not report costs higher than 100 pesos in the profit margin question. Profits calculated as sales
minus costs, on the other hand, do have negative values. Thus we also report treatment effects for the log of the
second method, but not the first.
We calculate two separate measures of enterprise productivity. The first is the residual from a
regression of log sales on log employees and log business assets. The second is return on assets (ROA), defined
as profits (calculated as sales minus costs) divided by business assets.
Similarly to sales, the variances of profits, assets, productivity and ROA are large. For this reason, we
include the averages of the one percent trimmed variables in Table 2, dropping the top and bottom one percent
of outliers for profits calculated as sales minus costs, productivity and ROA. For assets and for profits calculated
based on profit margin and sales, we only drop the top one percent of outliers since these variables are bounded
below by zero. Overall, the averages of the one percent trimmed variables are very similar across the treatment
and control groups.
In Table 3, we examine whether the baseline characteristics summarized above predict which
enterprises in the treatment group decided to participate in the consulting program. Column 1 includes only
enterprise and principal decision maker background characteristics. In Column 2, we add business performance
variables to the estimation. The results reveal three strong predictors of take‐up. First, enterprises with a male
principal decision maker were about 20 percentage points more likely to participate in the program than
enterprises with a female principal decision maker. Second, enterprises with higher sales, as well as enterprises
with higher productivity, have higher take‐up rates. We also find weak evidence that older principal decision
makers were less likely to take‐up the program.
We conducted a follow‐up survey between March and May 2009 (i.e., one to three months after the
intervention ended, which is 12‐15 months after the intervention began), re‐interviewing 378 enterprises or 88
percent of the 432 enterprises interviewed at baseline, to measure the impact of the consulting services on
business outcomes. Out of the 54 enterprises that could not be re‐interviewed, eleven enterprises were
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confirmed closed 10 , 31 declined to participate in the interview 11 and seven enterprises could not be tracked
down despite repeated contact attempts. The remaining five enterprises had merged with another enterprise –
one of them with an enterprise outside our sample and two with two other enterprises in the sample. For these
five enterprises, we were not able to obtain separate data for the unit corresponding to the original enterprise,
and thus they are not included in the analysis. We provide an analysis of attrition rates and correlates with
baseline information in the appendix. We show that there are no differential attrition rates across treatment
and control groups; neither do we see compositional shifts.

4. Results and Discussion
Our main specification uses OLS regressions for the various outcome measures on an indicator variable
for whether the enterprise was assigned to the treatment rather than the control group. The coefficients on this
indicator variable are displayed in Tables 4 through 6 and represent the intention‐to‐treat effect of the
consulting program. In all regressions, we control for strata dummies and re‐randomization variables 12 , as
suggested in Bruhn and McKenzie (2009). We also include the baseline outcome variable as an additional control
variable and show the results with and without this control. For observations where the baseline value of the
outcome is missing, we replace this value with zero and include a dummy variable indicating that the value is
missing, in order to keep the observation in the sample.

4.1 Business Performance
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We verified with the former principal decision maker and/or neighbors that these enterprises had indeed closed. In the
empirical analysis, we replaced employees, sales, costs, and assets for these enterprises with zero. The percentage of closed
enterprises was lower in the treatment group (1.4 percent) than in the control group (3.3 percent). However, the difference
is not statistically significant.
11
The percentage of enterprises that refused the interview was slightly higher in the control group (8.7 percent) than in the
treatment group (5.6 percent), but the difference between these two numbers is not statistically significant.
12
Due to baseline data entry typos that were discovered and corrected after the randomization took place, a few values of
the variables included in the randomization procedure do not correspond to the true baseline values. The strata dummies
and re‐randomization controls included in the regressions, contain the values originally used in the randomization
procedure. All other baseline data used in the summary statistics and regressions, , contains the true baseline values.
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The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 suggest that the consulting program increased monthly profits,
calculated based on sales and profit margin, by about 120 percent. Profits, calculated as sales minus costs, are
also higher in the treatment group than in the control group by about US$5,400. This effect is, however, not
statistically significant, possibly due to the noise in this measure. Unlike profits calculated based on sales and
profit margin, we cannot use the log of sales minus costs to reduce the influence of outliers since this variable
has negative values. In order to check whether results are robust to outliers, we estimate the results for one
percent trimmed variables (Columns 3 and 4) and for two percent trimmed variables (Columns 5 and 6). The
effect of the consulting program on profits calculated as sales minus costs is positive in all three samples but is
only statistically significant in the one percent trimmed sample, and the magnitude of the effect varies from
US$4,300 to US$7,750. The effect on log profits calculated based on sales and profit margin, on the other hand,
is robust in size and is statistically significant at the five percent level in all three samples.
Table 1 also shows a positive impact of the consulting on sales, of about 80 percent, but the effect is
only marginally statistically significant in the full sample, at the 12.1 percent level without controlling for the
baseline sales, and at the 10.3 percent level, after controlling for baseline sales.
The results in Table 1 further suggest that the consulting improved enterprise productivity as measured
by the residual from a productivity regression and also as measured by ROA, by about one fifth of a standard
deviation. In contrast, Table 1 does not show any statistically significant effect on employment. This could be
due to the fact that the consulting ended after one year instead of two as initially planned. A one‐year follow‐up
period may also be too short to expect an effect on slow moving variables, such as employment; having said
that, it makes it clear that the consulting was not directly attending to labor market failures, i.e., in helping
enterprises learn how to hire and train workers.
Overall, the results suggest that the consulting did improve business outcomes for the enterprises in the
treatment group. However, the effects on sales and productivity are only statistically significant at the 10
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percent level, likely because the data are quite noisy and the sample size is relatively small. Many enterprises in
treatment and control group do not report sales, costs, and assets, further reducing the sample size.
Our estimated effects of the consulting on sales and profits of 80 and 120 percent, respectively, are
large compared to the estimated impacts of improved access to capital and of business training for small
businesses found in the literature. De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) estimate a return to capital of five
percent for Sri Lankan microenterprises, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) find 20‐33 percent return to capital in
Mexico, and Udry and Anagol (2006) find 60 percent for Ghana. Banerjee and Duflo (2004) estimate an elasticity
of sales with respect to bank credit of 0.75 for large Indian enterprises. Bruhn and Zia (2011) detect an increase
in profits of 53 percent for entrepreneurs with ex‐ante high levels of financial literacy who participated in a
classroom‐based business training program. One concern could be that there might be potential demand
effects in the survey response if treatment enterprises overstate their outcomes to justify receiving subsidized
consulting services. This could possibly inflate the effects on the outcomes for the treatment group. While we
tried to provide positive incentives to answer the surveys even for the firms in the control group by promising
them preferential access to future consulting programs, there still might have been a differential bias between
treatment and control groups.
4.2 Process Variables
In order to investigate the channels that drive the observed effects on sales, productivity, and profits,
we now study how the consulting program changed processes within the enterprise. We measure these
processes as follows. First, the surveys asked enterprise owners whether or not they implemented certain
changes during the past year, such as developing new products, attracting new investors, and launching a new
marketing campaign. Note that if treatment enterprises believed they should please the program by reporting
process changes that did not actually occur, these estimates will be upwardly biased.
Second, we constructed an entrepreneurial spirit index, developed in collaboration with IPPC. This index
is based on the answers to the eight questions listed in Appendix 1, which intend to capture entrepreneurial
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attitudes of the principal decision maker, and is generated using Principal Components Analysis (PCA). Third, we
use a PCA human resources management index based on the six questions listed in Appendix 1. Fourth, we
asked enterprise owners how they keep their accounts and classify accounting practices as formal if they use
either an accountant or a computerized system as opposed to keeping handwritten or no notes at all.
Table 5 displays the treatment effects on business process variables. We only find statistically significant
improvements in three processes: made a new marketing effort (13 percentage points increase),
entrepreneurial spirit index (17 percent of a standard deviation increase), and the percent of enterprises that
keep formal accounts (7 percentage points increase). Other processes examined in Table 5, such as registering a
patent, developing new products or attracting new investors, do not appear to be changed significantly. These
could be more difficult to detect since they are more heterogeneous across enterprises, or require a longer time
to change than is observable in the treatment period. In addition, since the content of the consulting was
tailored to each firm’s needs it is perhaps not surprising that we do not see improvements in some of the
processes in Table 5, on average. But it is puzzling that treatment enterprises do not report acquiring new clients
at a higher rate than enterprises in the control group. Either the estimated increase in sales and profits is
entirely driven by sales to existing clients, or the data on new clients are misreported or too noisy to detect an
effect.
The finding that the program increased marketing efforts and the use of formal accounting practices is
consistent with the case study evidence mentioned in Section 2, which suggests that many enterprises worked
on accounting and record keeping, as well as sales strategy and adverting, with their mentors. Similarly, the
increase in the entrepreneurial spirit index might reflect the fact that enterprise owners set new goals as part of
the program and that consultants helped to provide motivation and strategy for how to achieve these goals. A
potential limitation to interpreting the entrepreneurial spirit index as a process variable is that it might improve
as a result of better enterprise performance instead of the other way around. Two of the questions used to
construct the index are particularly subject to this criticism (Questions d and e in Appendix 1). As a robustness
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check, we construct the index without these two questions. As shown in Table 5, the results for this modified
entrepreneurial spirit index are basically unchanged.

4.3 Response to Economic Shocks
The program could have also improved enterprise performance by helping enterprises cope better with
the 2008 economic crisis. In the follow‐up survey, about 89 percent of enterprises – both in the treatment and
control group – reported that they had been affected by the crisis. We asked these enterprises what changes
they made in response to the crisis. Table 6 displays the answers to these questions and examines whether the
responses differed across the treatment and control groups. The results show that treatment enterprises are
eight percentage points (standard error of four percentage points) less likely than control enterprises to report
that they had to cut production in response to the crisis. The ability to weather shocks more effectively could be
a result of being able to more proactively engage in marketing activities and better control finances, as shown in
the previous section. Enterprises that are less well trained in these skills might experience economic shocks
more passively and do not have tools to counteract a shortfall in demand.
Other changes in response to the crisis were not statistically significant across the treatment and control
groups, but one of magnitude (but not statistical significance) to note is a positive impact on seeking
government assistance (a 5.6 percentage points increase, standard error of 4.4 percentage points, relative to an
average of 12.8 percent in the control group). For enterprises that reported seeking government assistance, we
asked which program or agency they contacted and most answers indicate state or federal programs that
provide funding or subsidies to micro, small, and medium‐sized enterprises.

5. Cost‐Effectiveness: Why Don’t More Enterprises Use Consulting Services?
Given the large increases in sales and profits observed in Section 4.2, we ask why more firms do not use
consulting services. In particular, a cost‐effectiveness calculation suggests that the returns to hiring a consultant
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are well worth the cost. The average increase in monthly profits lies between US$7,600, and US$11,000
(depending on the measure of profits), compared to an annual cost of the consulting services of US$11,856.
Since the program was highly subsidized, participating enterprises only had to pay between 10 and 30 percent of
this cost (depending on firm size). Yet among the enterprises in the treatment group, only 53 percent chose to
participate in the subsidized consulting program once offered a spot.
Several issues may hinder the market in consulting services. First, there may be no failure at all: those
who opt‐in may be the ones who can benefit, and those who do not opt‐in would not benefit. Naturally we do
not observe what the impact would have been on those who do not opt‐in, but given the excessive gap between
the average increase in profits and the cost of the service, there seems to remain a failure for those who did opt‐
in, in that they had not taken up the services before, even at the unsubsidized rate. It is important to emphasize
that all enterprises in our study had initially expressed interest in the subsidized consulting program, and that
their views are thus not representative of enterprises that do not have a pre‐existing interest in consulting
services. It could be that firms expressed an interest, learned more about the service, and then decided that this
was unlikely to yield profitable results for them, and thus failure to take‐up remains a rational and correct
decision.
Second, there may be a credit market failure. In fact, most of the enterprises in the treatment group
that declined participation in the program once offered a spot gave liquidity constraints as the reason. This is
consistent with the finding in Section 3 that treatment group enterprises with higher sales and higher ROA were
more likely to take up the program. However, it still begs the question: why do we not observe consulting firms
accepting delayed payment, or working with financial services firms to provide credit to cover their services?
Either way, it suggests a credit market failure is the source of the problem for some enterprises.
Third, entrepreneurs may be risk‐ or ambiguity‐averse with respect to the potential returns from hiring a
consultant. This could be perpetuated by lack of information in the market on the returns to consulting advice
(and which consulting firms have difficulty credibly signaling).
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To examine this issue, in the follow‐up survey we included some qualitative questions for the control
group on whether they were using any consulting or mentoring services, and if not why not. About 21 percent of
control group enterprises said that they were indeed using some services, and provided the name of the
consulting firm they were using. Examining these names reveals that only about half of these firms offer
management consulting services similar to the consulting firms that worked with the treatment group
enterprises. The other firms mentioned by the control group provide specialized services, such as accounting or
technical assistance. Overall, the incidence of using management consulting services in the control group
appears to be around 10 percent. Table 7 lists the self‐reported reasons why control group enterprises do not
use consulting services. By far the most frequently mentioned reason is lack of funds (46.3 percent of
enterprises mention this reason), followed by uncertainty about the benefits of consulting services (22.2
percent) and simply not having considered hiring a consultant (18.5 percent).
Our findings indicate that management consulting services can have high returns for micro, small, and
medium enterprises, and we consider funding constraints to be the most likely explanation for the lack of
market transactions in consulting services.

6. Conclusion
Our results suggest that lack of managerial skills constitutes a significant constraint to firm growth and
the ability of micro, small, and medium enterprises to withstand economic shocks. The effects of the study are
large. On average we find an increase in sales and profits of 80 and 120 percent, respectively, for the treatment
group compared to the control group. However, we believe that the magnitude of the impact is not
unreasonable given that many enterprises in the sample had not received any formal management training prior
to our intervention. The sales and productivity improvements seem to be brought about primarily by
improvements in marketing and financial controls. Consultants also appear to have helped enterprises to set
clear goals and define a strategy for how to achieve these goals.
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In contrast, we do not see any significant impact on employment generation or the number of
employees. One can only speculate whether the scope of the intervention was not long or significant enough to
affect employment, or whether the decision to hire additional workers would have to be preceded by even
larger or more sustained increases in output. Alternatively, some recent studies suggest that there is large
heterogeneity in the willingness of small businesses to expand which may be due to variation in the owners’
objective function (see for example Hurst and Pugsley 2011).
Overall our results suggest that managerial inputs have a large and important impact on firm
performance. However, there is still much to learn about the way this information affects firm performance as a
whole and more specifically how it interacts with the marginal productivity of inputs such as labor and capital. In
addition, while there may be a lot of heterogeneity in effects our sample is not large enough to allow us to look
at all the firm level interactions that might be of interest, such as competitive nature of the industry, age and
gender of the owner, owner’s ambition level, risk taking ability, or general skill levels. We believe this is a critical
area for further research.
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Appendix 1: Survey Questions for Entrepreneurial Spirit and
Human Resources Management Indices

Survey Questions for Entrepreneurial Spirit Index
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

a.

I have professional goals.

1

2

3

4

5

b.

I revise my goals periodically.

1

2

3

4

5

c.

If I don’t reach a goal in the way I wanted
to I try again.

1

2

3

4

5

d.

I can’t motivate my business partners.*

1

2

3

4

5

e.

Everything I need for success lies in myself.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

I prefer talking about solutions, not
problems.*
I think the government should give me
g.
opportunities.*
I have to reach some goals every day to
h.
feel satisfied.
*Reverse coded
f.

Survey Questions for Human Resources Management Index

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

The employees identify with the objectives
of the company.
The firm lets its employees know if they
have done something wrong.
All responsibilities are clearly assigned for
each of the members of the firm.
All decisions are made by the same person.
The firm gives positive recognition to its
employees.
There is low turnover of employees in the
firm.

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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Table 1: Topics that Firms Worked on with Their Consultant
Based on Eight Case Studies
Topic
Define mission and vision statements
Accounting and record keeping (training and/or new software)
Clarify organizational structure, clearly assign responsibilities
Sales strategy and advertising (marketing)
Strategically select location and number of sales points
Quality control
Access to credit or alternative financing solutions
Human resources management and hiring practices
Mediate family problems in family firms
Pricing strategy
Reduce costs (negotiate with suppliers, find alternative suppliers)
Figure out which products are most profitable and focus on these
Team work and communications training for employees
Leadership training for firm owners
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# of firms that covered this topic
6
5
5
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 2: Baseline Summary Statistics

Panel A: Stratification variables
Manufacturing sector dummy
Commerce sector dummy
Services sector dummy
Full‐time paid employees

Treatment
Mean
(Std Dev)
(1)
0.300
(0.460)
0.253
(0.436)
0.447
(0.499)
14.400
(30.887)

Panel B: Re‐randomization variables
Age of principal decision maker (years)

Control
Mean
(Std Dev)
(2)
0.323
(0.468)
0.230
(0.422)
0.447
(0.498)
13.684
(31.479)

Orthogonality
Verification
(1)‐(2)
t‐stat
(p‐value)
(3)
‐0.023
(0.630)
0.023
(0.597)
0.000
(0.998)
0.716
(0.821)

42.561
42.876
‐0.315
(10.212)
(9.878)
(0.756)
Male principal decision maker dummy
0.727
0.720
0.007
(0.447)
(0.450)
(0.881)
Years of schooling of principal decision maker
15.630
15.932
‐0.302
(4.919)
(5.196)
(0.559)
Business age (years)
11.053
13.652
‐2.599
(10.330)
(28.120)
(0.275)
N
150
282
432
Note: Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 display means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Columns 3
and 6 show the difference in means across the treatment and control group with the
corresponding p‐value in parentheses. Column 7 shows the difference‐in‐difference in means with
the corresponding p‐value in parentheses. For the 1% trimmed variables, last month's sales,
assets, as well as profits calculated based on profit margin and sales, are only trimmed at the top
1% since they are bounded below by zero. All other variables are trimmed at the top and bottom
1%. Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Table 2: Baseline Summary Statistics (continued)
Orthogonality
Verification
Treatment
Control
(1)‐(2)
Mean
Mean
t‐stat
(Std Dev)
(Std Dev)
(p‐value)
Panel C: Other variables ‐ business outcomes
(1)
(2)
(3)
Last month's sales (1000s USD)
76.343
50.844
25.499
(283.025)
(119.987)
(0.222)
Last month's sales (1000s USD), 1% trimmed
40.479
46.113
‐5.634
(97.605)
(94.238)
(0.591)
Profits (sales minus costs, 1000s USD)
12.498
‐3.713
16.211
(111.446)
(202.489)
(0.426)
Profits (sales minus costs, 1000s USD), 1% trimmed
9.251
9.590
‐0.339
(58.564)
(48.851)
(0.955)
Profits (profit margin and sales, 1000s USD)
13.659
12.253
1.407
(42.718)
(36.997)
(0.753)
Profits (profit margin and sales, 1000s USD), 1% trimmed
8.797
9.522
‐0.725
(22.443)
(20.361)
(0.766)
Business assets (1000s USD)
296.963
945.842
‐648.879
(767.969)
(7822.005)
(0.376)
Business assets (1000s USD), 1% trimmed
251.358
259.471
‐8.113
(594.726)
(503.203)
(0.898)
Productivity residual
0.028
‐0.016
0.045
(1.349)
(1.253)
(0.787)
Productivity residual 1% trimmed
0.003
0.009
‐0.006
(1.189)
(1.155)
(0.968)
Return on assets (ROA)
‐0.026
0.151
‐0.177
(0.956)
(0.808)
(0.119)
Return on assets (ROA) 1% trimmed
0.110
0.095
0.015
(0.318)
(0.487)
(0.802)
N
150
282
432
Note: Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 display means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Columns 3 and 6
show the difference in means across the treatment and control group with the corresponding p‐value in
parentheses. Column 7 shows the difference‐in‐difference in means with the corresponding p‐value in
parentheses. For the 1% trimmed variables, last month's sales, assets, as well as profits calculated based
on profit margin and sales, are only trimmed at the top 1% since they are bounded below by zero. All
other variables are trimmed at the top and bottom 1%. Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent,
***1 percent.
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Table 3: Predictors of Program Take‐Up
OLS
Dependent variable:
Binary = 1 if treatment
group firm took up the
program
(1)
(2)
‐0.106
‐0.132
(0.109)
(0.110)
‐0.035
‐0.031
(0.097)
(0.097)
0.099**
0.046
(0.040)
(0.047)
‐0.006
‐0.008*
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.189**
0.212**
(0.090)
(0.090)
0.005
0.005
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.047**
(0.023)
‐0.021

Commerce sector dummy
Services sector dummy
Log (full‐time paid employees + 1)
Age of principal decision maker (years)
Male principal decision maker dummy
Business age (years)
Log (last month's sales + 1)
Log (profits + 1):
Profits calculated by multiplying profit
margin by sales
Return on assets (ROA)

(0.019)

Constant

0.429**
(0.216)
0.122
148
0.533

R‐squared
N
Average of dependent variable

0.088***
(0.021)
0.334
(0.251)
0.172
148
0.533

Note: All explanatory variables are measured at baseline. Binary control
variables included for when covariate is missing, and then missing covariate
coded as zero. Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Table 4: Treatment Effect Estimates, Business Outcomes
OLS
Full
sample
Full
Full
1%
1%
2%
2%
control
sample
sample trimmed trimmed trimmed trimmed
group
mean
Outcome variable
(std. dev.)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
0.079
0.096
0.063
0.092
0.077
0.111
1.835
Log (full‐time paid employees + 1)
(0.090)
(0.080)
(0.091)
(0.081)
(0.091)
(0.080)
(1.189)
389
389
385
385
381
381
0.562
0.563*
0.573
0.585*
0.625*
0.623*
Log (last month's sales + 1)
7.994
(0.365)
(0.335)
(0.369)
(0.340)
(0.369)
(0.342)
(3.640)
323
319
323
319
315
315
5.921
5.426
7.609*
7.751*
4.362
4.335
Profits:
9.707
(5.178)
(5.071)
(4.247)
(4.179)
(3.283)
(3.202)
Calculated as sales minus costs
(93.057)
288
288
282
276
282
276
0.687
0.544
‐0.415
‐0.202
‐0.128
0.017
Profits:
8.733
(2.728)
(2.435)
(1.560)
(1.396)
(1.250)
(1.142)
(23.170)
Calculated by multiplying profit margin
309
309
306
303
by sales
306
303
0.802**
0.820**
0.761**
0.794**
0.797**
0.828**
Log (profits + 1):
6.261
(0.352)
(0.336)
(0.349)
(0.334)
(0.349)
(0.335)
(3.451)
Profits calculated by multiplying profit
margin by sales
309
309
306
306
303
303
‐0.052
‐0.107
‐0.098
‐0.129
‐0.107
‐0.168
Log (business assets)
11.215
(0.176)
(0.156)
(0.172)
(0.156)
(0.174)
(0.156)
(1.699)
319
319
315
315
312
312
0.266*
0.249*
0.199
0.193*
0.242** 0.232**
‐0.095
Productivity residual
(0.140)
(0.129)
(0.122)
(0.116)
(0.116)
(0.111)
(1.272)
Residual from regression of log profits
250
250
on log employees and log business assets
244
244
240
240
0.120*
0.114*
0.061
0.057
0.061*
0.064*
Return on assets (ROA)
‐0.015
(0.061)
(0.065)
(0.040)
(0.045)
(0.034)
(0.036)
(0.541)
247
247
241
241
237
237
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
‐
Controls for baseline value of outcome
Note: Each cell contains the treatment effect point estimate, robust standard error, and number of observations, for a
separate OLS estimation. For the regressions that control for the outcome variable measured at baseline (Columns 2, 4, and
6), when the baseline outcome variable is missing, the missing value is filled‐in with zero and a dummy variable indicating
that the baseline observation is missing is added to the model. All regressions include controls for strata dummies and re‐
randomization variables. In the x% trimmed samples, full‐time paid employees, last month's sales, assets, as well as profits
calculated based on profit margin and sales, are only trimmed at the top x% since they are bounded below by zero. All other
variables are trimmed at the top and bottom x%. We use log(profits + 1) instead of log(profits) for profits calculated by
multiplying profit margin by sales since some principal decision makers reported zero sales for the last month. Significance
levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Table 5: Treatment Effect Estimates, Business Processes
OLS

Outcome variable
Developed new products during last year dummy
Attracted new clients during last year dummy
Implemented new process during last year
dummy
Attracted new investors during last year dummy
Began process to register a patent during last
year dummy
Began certification process for an international
standard (e.g. ISO)
Made new marketing effort during last year
dummy
Expanded installations during last year dummy
Remodeled installations during last year dummy
Entrepreneurial spirit index
Entrepreneurial spirit index w/o questions d and
e (see Appendix 1)
Human resources management index
Keeps formal accounts dummy
Controls for baseline value of outcome

Full
sample
(1)
‐0.039
(0.056)
‐0.017
(0.046)
‐0.056
(0.053)
0.026
(0.032)
0.054
(0.034)
‐0.022
(0.035)
0.132**
(0.055)
‐0.024
(0.045)
0.025
(0.054)
0.242*
(0.140)
0.245*
(0.140)
‐0.053
(0.152)
0.072**
(0.030)
No

Full
sample
(2)
‐0.038
(0.054)
‐0.030
(0.045)
‐0.066
(0.052)
0.024
(0.031)

Observations
(3)
378
376
378
378
376
378
378
377
377

0.227
(0.139)
0.210
(0.138)
‐0.050
(0.147)
0.065**
(0.028)
Yes

373
373
363
378

Control group
mean
(std. dev.)
(4)
0.531
(0.500)
0.789
(0.409)
0.617
(0.487)
0.074
(0.262)
0.079
(0.270)
0.156
(0.364)
0.440
(0.497)
0.240
(0.428)
0.459
(0.499)
‐0.094
(1.371)
‐0.095
(1.343)
0.022
(1.450)
0.852
(0.356)
‐

Note: Columns 1 and 2 contain the treatment effect point estimates, robust standard errors, and number of
observations, for separate OLS estimations. All regressions include controls for strata dummies and re‐
randomization variables. Some variables are not available at baseline, which is why the corresponding cells in
Colum 2 are empty. Column 4 includes the control group mean and standard deviation of each variable at
follow‐up. Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Table 6: Treatment Effect Estimates, Changes in Response to Crisis
OLS
Outcome variable
Laid off staff or cut down on hiring
Lowered employee salaries
Cut production
Diversified business activities
Sought government assistance
None
Other
Number of changes made
N

Full sample
(1)
0.036
(0.053)
‐0.023
(0.032)
‐0.080**
(0.040)
‐0.015
(0.057)
0.056
(0.044)
‐0.005
(0.037)
0.045
(0.050)
0.020
(0.093)
340

Control group mean & std. dev.
(2)
0.257
(0.438)
0.092
(0.289)
0.206
(0.406)
0.431
(0.496)
0.128
(0.335)
0.115
(0.319)
0.216
(0.412)
1.330
(0.810)
218

Note: Column 1 contains the treatment effect point estimates and robust standard
errors for separate OLS estimations. All outcome variables, except for "number of
changes made", are binary variables for the responses to the question "Which changes
has your firm made in response to the current economic situation?" (multiple answers
were allowed). This question was asked at follow‐up in reference to the recent economic
crisis. "Number of changes made" is a count of the number of changes reported in
response to the question above. All regressions include controls for strata dummies and
re‐randomization variables. Column 2 includes the control group mean and standard
deviation of each variable. Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent.
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Table 7: Self‐Reported Reasons for Not Using Consulting Services
% of enterprises
Reasons for not using consulting services
mentioning this reason
(multiple mention)
Would be a good investment, but don't have funds
46.3
Don't know what the benefits would be
22.2
Simply hadn't considered it
18.5
Didn't need the services
13.9
Other
11.1
Didn't know these services existed
7.4
Not worth the cost
5.6
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